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ABSTRACT
1. The potential collateral efficiency of housing is the cornerstone on
which to develop a housing finance system. This fact is not always fully
appreciated. In developing countries, this collateral question goes beyond the
provision of mortgage services for housing ownership, as is the case in developed
countries. What is sometime overlooked is that the nature and function of real
property wealth changes with the level of development. In developing countries,
a high level of consumption of housing services is less critical than the role
of housing as a savings vehicle. Housing assets are reliable income generating
assets at a stage when salaried incomes, social security systems and retirement
systems are not well developed. In inflationary economies, housing assets also
have the advantage of providing a return in kind in the form of housing services.
The collateral qualities of housing for short or long-term borrowing and this
real-denominated return from housing investment are two of three reasons why
housing can contribute much to overall financial development. The third reason,
is that housing makes up a large and growing share of total tangible assets as
an economy develops. Therefore improvements in housing finance can be expected
to have a very positive impact on overall financial deepening.
2. To show the collateral power of housing in a developing country, this
paper analyses the operation of the "Chonse" housing deposit which is a widely
used informal financial claim in Korea. Essentially, a "chonse" claim is a large
deposit given to a landlord instead of rent. When the tenant leaves the housing
unit, the "chonse" deposit is returned by the landlord. What is exchanged is
the use of the capital by the landlord for the consumption of housing services
by his tenant. For both landlord and tenant the housing unit is the key for
developing very important financial services. Chonse is an instrument to finance
investment by households and unincorporated small firms, in short the household
firm. It has also been the prime household saving instrument for many Korean
families. This Chonse financial claim developed very rapidly in the informal
sector during the post-war period. It was a creative response to a severe
shortage of financial services when the urban sector was expanding rapidly, the
financial sector was very small, and the economy was experiencing significant
periods of negative real interest rates on banking deposits. During that period,
Chonse has become the dominant financial claim of the household sector. Its
operations are intimately linked to the economic characteristics of housing, but
its effects have reached beyond housing to many forms of small scale urban
investments with significant employment effects.
3. The paper first presents financial conditions in Korea during the
period 1960-1985. Over that time, the economy spanned almost the entire range
of developing country incomes from US$100 to US$2,200 per capita and was a
microcosm of most financial development issues. This description is followed
by the analysis of two key aspects of Chonse. First, the analysis shows how the
collateral value of housing, measured by the ratio of the Chonse deposit to the
value of the unit fluctuates according to interest rate levels and financial
market conditions. Second, it evaluates the impact of this asset-constrained
system on housing tenure choices and access to housing. The resulting structure
of the total housing finance system is described. The paper closes with evidence
on the impacts of this housing finance system on capital formation and mentions
briefly two important questions regarding financial liberalization strategies:
whether rationing the supply of mortgage lending actually stimulates household
savings and the extent to which liberalization of the housing finance system
could precede overall financial sector liberalization.
4. The development of the Chonse system in Korea illustrates the
continuity which often exists between the creative development of a financial
innovation in the informal sector at low levels of income and the formal
financial services available to meet similar needs in more advanced economies.
Both informal arrangements and formal financial instruments can coexist to
provide needed services. However, there comes a time when the large relative
size of the informal sector compared to the formal housing finance becomes a
measure of the failure of public policies to permit significant housing finance
development rather than an indicator of serious scale and income constraints on
the operations of housing finance institutions. This is the case of Korea today.
- ii -
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UNDERSTANDING THE COLLATERAL QUALITIES OF HOUSING
FOR FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT:
The Korean "Chonse" as Effective Response
to Financial Sector Shortcomings
I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT DO INFORMAL HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEMS
TELL US ABOUT FINANCIAL POLICIES?
1.01 Financial policies in developing countries have long been dominated
by concerns for needs of the trade sector and large incorporated firms.
However, in terms of total financial claims, it is the decentralized smaller
scale unincorporated sector which generates the greatest proportion of total
finance through the economy. Many of these claims are informal in the sense that
the structure of contracts is not regulated and the suppliers of finance are not
supervised by financial authorities. In particular, informal or non-
institutional housing finance arrangements make up the greatest share of
financial services to the housing sector. These informal housing finance
arrangements can provide important information about the quality of on-going
financial policies toward the urban non-corporate sector. With the rapid
shrinking of the non-monetized economy everywhere, financial policies, fiscal
policies and monetary policies are bound to have major impacts on sources of non-
corporate finance, directly and indirectly.
1.02 Housing and small business finance are linked to the rapid urbanization
which has been the dominant story in developing countries during the second half
of this century. As cities go, so goes the future of the economy because it
is not possible to build an efficient and growing national economy on
unproductive or chaotic cities. An important turn-around in thinking--no doubt
caused by the erosion of public resources during the decade--has been the
recognition that urbanization is functionally linked to development and is a
wealth generating process reflected in real estate prices in cities. This
process may not be going too well, there may be inequalities in accessing this
wealth which may also not be tapped adequately for the financing of the key
public investments. Making the building of developing cities more efficient,
more productive and facilitating the economic integration of low-income
populations have been daily concerns for a long time. Cities are build the way
they are financed. Too many distressed formal financial systems and a renewed
focus on private market activities have revived interest in understanding formal
and informal mechanisms financing urban investment and their stability.l/
1/ See World Development Report 1989 , especially Chapter 2 "Why does
finance matter?" and Chapter 5 "Financial Systems in Distress".
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1.03 New questions are being raised at international meetings such as:2 ,
why do many key ministries keep looking at housing exclusively as a welfare
problem rather than as an economic activity? Housing is a key instrument of
capital formation for the household sector: how can this activity be shaped?
Housing can be very helpful in securing a financial infrastructure in the urban
economy: how can we develop financial systems that will facilitate the economic
integration of our large flows of migrants into the urban economy and make them
more productive? Properly organized, the housing sector can pay for itself and
generate additional resources for the residential infrastructure. Improving
housing finance can free public funds for the welfare support of the poorest,
but what are the key requirements? From a production viewpoint, considerable
change in thinking is also taking place following the weak technical and
financial performance of so many public housing agencies.
1.04 Because of the linkages between the needs for greater domestic savings
mobilization and the dominant role that housing plays in household savings *nd
investment behavior, public policies toward housing finance have gained
importance in national economic management. Considering the extreme shortage
of mortgage finance in developing cities, the recurring question is why? Is the
cause to be found in endogenous economies of scale constraints such as thin
markets in mortgageable housing, low-income levels and high transaction costs
for financial institutions? Or is the shortage caused by inflationary
macroeconomic policies heavily dependent on debt financing interacting with
restrictive regulatory and financial policies which limit or rigidly define
access to the banking system by households and small urban firms? Each country
is therefore faced with a dual question: are current housing finance policies
consistent with overall financial sector objectives and conversely are financial
policies consistent with the financial services needed by the housing sector?
1.05 This paper has two objectives. The first one is to analyze a
particularly interesting informal financial claim linked to housing, the Korean
"Chonse". The "Chonse" system originates from a creative informal, private
response based on opportunities for mutual benefits in unfavorable financial
policy environments. Essentially, a "Chonse" claim is a large deposit given by
a tenant to a landlord instead of rent. When the tenant leaves the housing unit,
the "Chonse" deposit is returned by the landlord. What is exchanged is the use
of the capital by the landlord for the consumption of housing services by his
tenant. For both landlord and tenant the housing unit is the key for developing
very important financial services. This financial claim illustrates very well
how financial services for the household firm can be built upon the economic
characteristics of housing as a reliable and widely available collateral. The
paper analyses also the financial needs of housing as an important domestic
sector and shows how "Chonse" contracts have continuously adapted to the changing
financial environment. A second objective of this paper is to see what happens
in housing markets in terms of access to housing assets when the supply of
mortgage services is rationed in order to direct credit to "priority sectors".
Is such a policy likely to achieve its intended results? Are there unintended
2/ The questions listed are direct quotes from senior level delegates at
the Washington Policy Conference sponsored by U.S. AID , Washington, D.C.
November 7-9, 1988.
regressive effects that are undesirable from the viewpoint of public policy?
1.06 The nature and function of real property wealth change with the level
of development.31 In developing countries, real estate assets are first of all
income generating goods. In developed countries, real estate wealth plays a less
critical role as income generator because of the prevalence of salaried incomes,
social security and retirement systems together with the availability of a
diversity of financial and other assets. The merit of the Chonse case is to be
a very good example of how in developing countries, the consumption of housing
services is less important for many households than the role of housing a savings
vehicle. In addition, housing can play a very important role as collateral to
obtain financing in the productive activities of the household and unincorporated
sectors, two sectors which are in many cases difficult to distinguish. In
Korea, households have been borrowing for purposes very similar to those
encountered in other developing countries. A 1981 survey of household assets
and liabilities showed the following composition and purpose of household
borrowing: 41
Investment Related Borrowing 39.3%
Housing Related Borrowing 25.9%
Debt Repayments 15.3%
Family Celebrations 4.1%
School Fees 3.2%
Medical Expenses 3.1%
Large Consumer Goods 1.3%
Others 7.3%
The leading reason for borrowing is for investment purposes. This analysis which
follows aims to show that in Korea, like in other developing countries, housing
and real estate collateral has been playing an important role in a household or
small business' ability to borrow. In the informal sector, "Chonse" has been
is a major instrument.
1.07 The analysis of the Chonse system proceeds as follows: First, basic
information regarding the unregulated financial markets of Korea is presented
together with significant indicators of financial conditions in the urban markets
of Korea between 1963 and 1987. Then Chonse is described qualitatively. This
description is followed by an analysis of the impact of changing interest rates,
3/ For an analysis of long-term trends in wealth and its changing role,
see A. Babeau (1988)
i/ Survey of Borrower Finance, 1981. Citizen National Bank, Seoul.
inflation and real estate prices on the ratio of the value of the Chonse deposit
to the current value of the housing unit (or portion of it) which serves as
collateral and provides real-denominated payments in the form of rental services.
The second part of the analysis deals with the joint impact of Chonse and the
shortage of mortgage financing on household choices when both rental and
investment housing markets are constrained by the availability of financial
assets. The resulting structure of the total housing finance system covering
formal and informal housing finance in the mid-1980s in presented.
1.08 The final section of the paper presents evidence on the inefficiencies
and regressive distributive impacts of severely rationing mortgage supply on the
urban economy. Because macroeconomic reforms interact with financial reforms,
the benefits to Korea from successful adjustment policies and the beginnings of
liberalization are briefly shown. Two important questions for housing finance
liberalization are raised. First, does rationing the supply of mortgages
increase household savings or raise savings rates? Second, is there a sectoral
ordering in financial liberalization and could housing finance liberalization
proceed ahead or independently of overall financial liberalization?
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II. INSTITUTIONAL AND UNREGULATED FINANCIAL MARKETS: KOREA. 1960-1985,
A MICROCOSM OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
2.01 One of the advantages of analyzing Korea is that its economic growth
has been extremely rapid during the period 1960-1985 and spans most of the
income range of developing countries in this short time. Korean per capita GNP
has grown from US$100 in 1960 to an expected US$3,600 by the end of 1988. In
the process, the urban population share has risen from 37 percent in 1960 to 79
percent in 1985, based on urban areas above 20,000 people. The dynamic
interactions between financial policies and informal housing finance must have
changed considerably in an urban economy that has expanded 87-fold in 25 years.
Under such rapid variation, the Chonse system has moved from its seminal
financial environment typical of very poor economies where small scale
transactions prevails together with short duration of loans, and a tendency for
transactions to be geographically and socially concentrated to an income level
and minimum market scales where the provision of institutional housing finance
services is feasible. This economic feasibility threshold has certainly been
crossed during the 1980s if not much earlier in Korea and macroeconomic and
financial policies are the dominant factors in causing the continuing heavy
dependence on Chonse and informal housing finance.
2.02 Korea experienced significant inflation during that 25-year period,
until the successful macroeconomic and financial structural adjustment policies
of the early 1980s. The inflation rate was repeatedly above 20 percent (see
Table 1, column 1). This 20 percent level is a threshold beyond which most
analysts find that "it is extremely difficult for a financial system to function
efficiently .. . [and this]... adverse effect is aggravated by administered
interest rates, especially for longer-term intermediation operations."51 How
did Chonse respond to these constraints?
2.03 In spite of significant improvements since the early 1980s linked to
successful adjustment policies 61, the total financial system of Korea still
consists of a highly regulated formal system and unregulated markets which
interact in a complementary manner. The interactions within this dualistic
structure have been analyzed and do not need to be discussed here.2 1 Credit
demands--including corporate credit demands--
See Roe and Popiel, (1988).
Among others, these improvements include the privatization of the
commercial banks, a widening of the regulated interest rates band, greater
interest rate consistency across sectors and increased managerial autonomy.
7/ See for instance Yung-Chul Park (1976), David Cole and Yung-Chul Park
(1983), and Sweder van Wijnbergen (1981) and (1983).
Table it MAJOR ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR THE KOREA HOUSING MARKETS, 1963-1985
TABLE FOR WOR 1989 BACKGROUND PAPKR
YEAR ANNUAL TIME DEPOSIT CURB MKT. MORTGAGE CORPORATE TIME CURB MORTGAGE CORPORATE CURB TO CURB TO GNP PER CAPITA LAND HOUSING
CHARGE RATE RATE RATE BOND DEPOSITS MARKET RATE YIELD DEPOSITS MORTGAGE GROWTH RTE GNP PRICE PRICE
CPI (1) (NOMINAL) (NOMINAL) (NOMINAL) YIELD (REAL) (REAL) (REAL) (REAL) SPREAD SPREAD (REAL) (GROWTH) INCREASE INCREASE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
1960
1961
1962
1963 20.2 15 52.4 -4.3 26.8 31.1 9.1 6.52 51
1964 29.6 15 61.4 -11.3 24.5 35.8 9.6 7.02 30.3
1965 13.8 26.4 58.8 11.1 39.5 28.5 5.8 3.22 34.6
1966 11.2 26.4 58.7 13.7 42.7 29.0 6.6 4.69 65 42
1967 10.8 26.4 56.4 23 14.1 41.2 11.0 27.1 -30.1 11.3 9.39 21.2 116.2
1968 10.4 25.2 55.9 20 13.4 41.2 8.7 27.8 -32.5 13.8 11.89 51.3 31.5
1969 12.7 22.8 57.2 20 9.0 39.5 6.5 30.5 -33.0 7.6 5.69 122.7 68.2
1970 35.6 22.8 50.8 20 6.2 30.4 3.8 24.2 -26.6 9.1 7.14 0.1 3.8
1971 13.5 20.4 46.3 20 6.1 28.9 5.7 22.8 -23.2 5.3 3.34 46.9 36.1
1972 11.3 12 38.9 18.2 22.9 0.4 24.6 6.0 10.2 24.1 -18.6 14 12.04 4 14.9
1973 3.2 12 39.2 15.2 21.8 8.3 34.9 11.6 18.0 26.4 -23.3 8.5 6.54 8 15.2
1974 24.5 15 37.6 15.5 21 -7.6 10.5 - 7.2 -2.8 18.2 -17.8 6.8 4.84 25.4 17.4
1975 25.3 15 41.3 15.5 20.1 -8.2 12.8 - 7.8 -4.2 21.0 -20.6 13.4 11.89 21.9 38.2
1976 15.3 16.2 40.5 16.5 20.4 0.8 21.9 1.0 4.4 21.1 -20.8 10.7 9.19 26 27.6
1977 10.2 14.4 38.1 15.5 20.1 3.8 25.3 4.8 9.0 21.5 -20.5 11 9.49 46.7 2 4 .3
1978 14.5 18.6 41.7 16.5 21.1 3.6 23.8 1.7 5.8 20.2 -22.0 7 5.49 79.1 73.7
1979 18.3 18.6 42.4 16.5 26.7 0.3 20.4 - 1.5 7.1 20.1 -21.9 -4.8 -6.31 22 10.9
1980 28.7 19.5 4 4 .9 19.5 30.1 -7.1 12.6 - 7.1 1.1 19.7 -19.7 6.6 3.04 17 16.2
1981 21.3 16.2 35.3 18.5 24.4 -4.2 11.5 - 2.3 2.6 15.7 -13.8 5.4 3.84 7.1 1.7
1992 7.3 8 30.6 14.1 17.3 0 .7 21.7 6.3 . 9.3 21.1 -15.4 11.9 10.34 5.6 1.6
1983 2.3 8 25.8 10 14.2 5.6 23.0 7.5 11.6 17.4 -15.4 8.4 6.84 31.7 9.5
1984 2.5 10 24.7 11.4 14.1 7.3 21.7 8.7 11.3 14.3 -13.0 5.4 3.84 21.6 7.6
1985 2.8 10 24 11.4 14.2 7.0 20.6 8.4 11.1 13.6 -12.3 12.3 10.74 7.8 -7.3
1986 3 10 22.4 11 12.8 6.8 18.8 7.8 9.5 12.0 -11.1 12 10.47 3.8 3.1
1987 3 21.3
1988
Sour-- Rook of Kor-, E-o-omt StatistIcal Year.books, MInistr of Contrutio..
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that cannot be met in the formal sector due to interest rates ceiling or to
credit allocation policies are redirected to the unregulated markets. In Korea,
the name "unregulated " financial markets is used in preference to "informal"
or "unorganized" because this parallel financial system is well-structured and
has clearly distinct segments.
2.04 Analysts often distinguish five main segments in the Korean unregulated
markets. In order of increasing complexity, scale and sophistication these are:
(i) a very insignificant and rudimentary private credit market which is
unorganized, (ii) the extensive variety of "kye" or rotating saving and credit
associations (ROSCA) for households and business services (iii) mutual credit
associations or "mujin" companies for small businesses, (iv) the informal bill
and commercial paper market, and (v) the large scale informal credit brokers
market generally called the "curb market" in Korea. There have been similarities
between curb market operators and private finance companies for consumers and
small enterprises. A major difference between the "curb market" and private
finance companies is that "curb" rates are uncontrolled while finance company
rates are regulated. Because of a lack of scale economies, imperfect information
and weaker enforceability of contracts, transaction costs and risk premia are
also very important. "Chonse" claims associated with housing are not usually
not mentioned explicitly in this list of components of the Korean unregulated
financial system in spite of the fact that their volume is much larger than
institutional housing finance as is shown later in this paper.
2.05 Because the formal financial system of Korea has long been subject to
considerable oversight and controls, the impact of ceilings on deposit and
lending rates has been particularly widespread. Real interest rates on the curb
market have been very high, and the dualistic structure of the financing of the
economy has been very sharp. Curb market rates have been continuously surveyed
by the Bank of Korea since at least 1963. Curb rates are also used as reference
by households and are relevant to the operation of the savings markets and
housing markets. The relationship between curb market rates and regulated 3-
months deposit rates is presented in Figures l.a and l.b in real terms. Another
important reference rate is the yield on corporate bonds which is considered the
best approximation to the opportunity cost of capital in Korea (See Table 1,
columns 5 and 9).
2.06 Major macroeconomic policy events and related financial episodes show
up in the otherwise long-term downward trend in nominal (and real) curb market
rates. Structural adjustment reforms have taken place between 1981 and 1985,
including incremental financial liberalization.81 Since then, the regulated
sector has grown very rapidly at the expense of informal finance. Two points
must be noted regarding trends in the Korean financial sector. First, deposit
rates and curb market rates tend to move in step reflecting the close
substitutability between bank deposits and curb market loans (See Figure l.a).
8/ See Yoon-Je Cho and David Cole "The Role of the Financial Sector in
Korea's Structural Adjustment" in Vittorio Corbo and Sang-Mok Suh eds. Structural
Adjustment in a Newly Industrialized Country: Lessons From Korea, World Bank book
manuscript, 1988.
FIGTRE l.a
KOREA REAL INTEREST RATE DIERENT[AI
TIME DEPOSIIS and CURB MARKET, 1963-86.
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Second, the originally sharp dualistic structure of the financial system has
converged over 25 years. The spread between real time deposit rates and curb
rates has declined. It used to be very large, about 30 percent at the time of
the 1965 interest rate reforms but has now come down to about 10 percent (See
Figure l.b). This spread is still significant and takes into account safety and
inefficiencies in the unregulated markets.
2.07 If the cost of funds in the unregulated market is known, the total size
of the unregulated market is not. There has been considerable interest in
knowing this size compared to the formal financial system and in trends over
time.91 Estimates of the curb market were made in 1972 due to the mandatory
registration of business-related claims. The downward-biased value was that the
curb market defined by items (4) and (5) above was equivalent to 25 to 33 percent
of M2, which in turn was equal to 37% of GNP.101 Following a curb market scandal
involving US$255 million of promissory notes, a study of its size was made in
1982 and again in 1985. The 1981 end-of-year estimate was that curb market
business loans amounted to 25 percent of Ml (with Ml itself representing 9
percent of GNP), 7 percent of formal business credit, and 10 percent of total
bank deposits. These two observations suggest a decline in the share of the
unregulated market from 12% of GNP in 1972 to 3% in 1981, but still a large
absolute size as the economy has expanded four-fold in money terms in the
intervening ten years. The value of outstanding Chonse claims itself has grown
rapidly with urban investment. Is quite large but it is not included in these
business-related curb market estimates. using 1980 census data on the diffusion
of Chonse, a tentative estimate is that Chonse claims outstanding were more than
seven times the value of mortgages provides by the banking system. Comparisons
with household savings deposits still need to be made.
2.08 The size of the non-corporate sector in the economy has changed over
time. Until the revision of the national accounts and flow-of-funds from 1980,
the household sector was not separated from the non-corporate sector. Estimated
shares of the non-corporate sector in national savings over a twenty year period,
derived from flow-of-funds data from the Bank of Korea are as follows:
1965 1970 1980 1985
National Savings 101.2% 71.6% 64.6% 92.0%
Government 44.4% 29.3% 16.9% 22.3%
Corporate 22.5% 13.8% 27.3% 35.7%
Non-Corporate 34.3% 28.5% 20.4% 34.0%
Foreign Savings -1.2% 28.4% 35.4% 8.0%
(Memo: GNP/capita) (US$105) (US$248) (US$1,606) (US$2,032)
i/ See BYEON, Yangho (1985) and RO, Sung-Tae (1986).
See Cole and Park (1983), Chapter 4.
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While these estimates would benefit from further refinement, it is clear that
the non-corporate sector has been a major component of the Korean economy
throughout the period. It is only since the early 1980s that the financing of
small and medium enterprises has become a priority issue in Korean policies.
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III. "CHONSE" AS RATIONAL RESPONSE TO A SEVERE SHORTAGE
OF FINANCIAL SERVICES
A. Main Parameters of the Korean Urban Economy Over
the Period 1960-1985
3.01 The Chonse system represents a very creative response of the household
and unincorporated sectors to the inability of financial institutions to provide
them with adequate services under rapid urbanization, inflation, negative real
bank deposit rates and the rigid rationing of banking loans. While occasionally
in use in rural areas, this system has played an important role in financing the
Korean urban economy over the period 1960-1985 which was characterized by the
following traits:
(a) A rapidly expanding urban system experiencing
population growth at a compounded rate of 5% per year
over 25 years.
(b) Urban wages rising at a real rate of 8 percent per
year between 1960 and 1986.
(c) Frequent periods of significant high inflation (see
Table 1, col. 1).
(d) Frequent periods of ex-post negative real deposit
rates (see Table 1, col.6).
(e) Consistently positive real curb market rates (see
Table 1, col. 7).
(f) Land and housing values appreciating rapidly at real
two-digit rates every year until the early 1980s (see
Table 1, cols. 14 and 15).
(g) High rates of household mobility for homeowners as
well as renters. Analyses of the 1980 census show
mobility rates of .323 per year for home owners
(a move every 3.1 year) and .769 for renters (a move
every 1.3 year) for the entire population of movers
and stayers.
(h) A greatly rationed supply of mortgage finance from
the creation of the Korea Housing Bank in 1967 up to
the present.
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B. Financial Characteristics of Chonse
Basic Features of This Financial Claim
3.02 In a developed economy, we look at the demand for residential mortgages
from two viewpoints: (i) mortgage debt as a form of consumer credit and
(ii) mortgage debt as a critical instrument for achieving the asset portfolio
objectives of a large proportion of households, a portfolio where housing
dominates. These two aspects of mortgage demand are increasingly present in the
Korean market. However, to explain the origin of Chonse, it is helpful to
reverse the direction of thinking and to start with the housing asset as a key
vehicle to generate the financial services that the banking system is not
providing to the household and unincorporated sector for a variety of regulatory
reasons.
3.03 The Chonse system predates the regulated housing finance system. A
Chonse deposit consists in the payment of a large lump sum deposit to a landlord
at the beginning of occupancy instead of monthly rental payments. The Chonse
payment is therefore not only a security deposit but also a substitute for rent.
In fact, the later function dominates because the Chonse deposit must be refunded
in its entirety by the landlord when the tenant vacates the dwelling. Instead
of raising rents when the rental market becomes tight or operating costs
increase, landlords increase the amount of Chonse at the renewal of rental
contracts. The interest foregone by the renter is expected to cover the implicit
rental value of the dwelling. Analyses show that imputed rents tend to be
competitively priced and reflect the cost of funds on the unregulated markets.
Therefore, the imputed rent is equivalent to Chonse deposit times the monthly
curb market rate (which was 1.4 percent per month in real terms in 1986, see
Table 1, col. 7). Chonse is one of the most popular rental arrangements in
Korea. As shown below, it also plays a important role in the purchase of
housing.
3.04 As a savings instrument, Chonse reflects the poor quality or absence
of household-oriented financial claims generated by the regulated financial
sector until recently (see times series on real deposit rates, Table l,col. 6)
On one hand, the tenants build up their savings with the periodical increase in
the deposit amount, generally every six months. They receive a real rate of
return on this financial asset which is positive but in kind in the form of
housing services. The return on Chonse should stay close to the curb market
rates where landlords can redeposit their funds. On the other hand, the yield
on Chonse money foregone by tenants must also be equal to the real-denominated
value of the housing services they receive. The size of the Chonse compared to
the value of the space rented can therefore rise rapidly when real market housing
rents rise and curb market interest rates decline, two prevalent trends in urban
Korea. Today, Chonse depositors still express satisfaction with Chonse as a
vehicle for self-imposed savings and asset accumulation. They view it as a
contractual savings scheme well suited to the deposit of the large periodic
bonuses which are part of the wage structure in Korea. Often, increases in
Chonse deposit contracts coincide with the large year-end bonuses.
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3.05 As a source of funds, Chonse exemplifies the inherent qualities of
residential real estate as collateral. Instead of borrowing from a bank against
this collateral, the owner of the dwelling is receiving a loan from his tenant
(or tenants). In terms of bargaining power, the lack of adequate housing finance
and the chronic scarcity of housing under extremely high urban population growth
rates have tended to favor landlords. 111 With Chonse, tenants assume all default
risk since the landlord receives the total deposit in advance. The renters'
countervailing power is the ability to remain on the premises until recovery of
their capital, but because they often double-up with their landlord this is a
poor, unpleasant remedy. As already noted, when a landlord is not using the
deposit to pay for real estate or business activities the money can be promptly
deposited with an informal dealer on the curb market.
Prior Accumulation of Financial Assets and Housing Tenure Choices
3.06 Due to the shortage of financial services, the composition of assets
held by households and the non-incorporated sector tends to be restricted to the
growth of households savings and/or retained earnings. Chonse plays an
alleviating role in the non-corporate sector and is also a major element in the
operations of the two housing markets: the market for housing services from the
existing housing stock and the market for new housing investment. Because a
Chonse contract implies the accumulation of substantial financial savings, both
housing markets are asset-based, not cash-flow based. This situation is clearly
a serious problem for the renters who have not accumulated much financial
savings. Cross-section and times series data comparing pure rental rates with
chonse deposits show that the return on Chonse stays close to the curb market
rate. Because of the need for a large accumulation of savings, tenants rent less
space than they would under a monthly rent system. Some tenants are too poor
to afford chonse deposits. They must use a 100% cash rent tenure and double or
triple up in some of the worst housing units. Longitudinal studies show that
rental tenants are low-income families incapable of improving their housing
conditions over time, while chonse renters improve their housing conditions with
every housing move.
3.07 The magnitudes involved in this housing-related financial claim are
very large measured against annual household incomes, the market value of the
rented space and in comparison with the supply of institutional housing finance
claims. Household surveys in the mid-1980s show that Chonse represents a very
high share of the capital cost or market value of the rented space or unit.
Typical Chonse ratios range between 35 percent and 40 percent of the market value
of the unit. These ratios are higher in large cities and often range up to 70
11/ During the second half of the 1970s the Korean economy became
overheated and housing rents were rising rapidly, See Figure 6.a, page . The
government was forced to recognize the significance of this "informal" market
and eventually a Tenancy Protection Law was passed in 1981 to specify the
characteristics of this unusual financial claim. The 1981 Law regulates the
frequency of Chonse deposit increases and improve a tenant's ability to recover
his deposit when vacating his unit.
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percent for apartments.121 Because it is not possible to accumulate such large
financial savings for housing, various types of contracts exist such as partial
Chonse, or declining Chonse which include a combination of cash deposit and
monthly payment. Such large financial claims coincide with doubling-up and room
rentals are very common due to the inadequacy of the housing stock, caused in
part by the inadequate housing finance system.
3.08 The price of housing compared to household income levels is very high
in Korea. The 1985 KRIHS Housing survey shows that the average unit/income ratio
is 5.5. Using an underestimate of the Chonse/unit ratio of 30 percent, we can
see that a typical renter must deposit 5.5 x 0.3 = 1.65 times its annual income.
It is indeed an unusual rental tenure arrangement which requires more than 20
months of salary as cash deposit.
3.09 With the rapid appreciation in real estate values (see Table 1, column
15), not all households can accumulate the financial savings required to secure
the rental of a full unit. There are therefore three broad classes of tenure
in Korea and gradations within each of them based on the financial asset-
constraint of households. These tenure choices are:
(a) Full ownership of a unit, with or without mortgage debt
outstanding.
(b) Chonse contracts themselves have five basic variations. In order
of declining asset requirements these are:
a. Exclusive Chonse: when the household is rich enough to rent
an entire unit and make a full Chonse deposit. The household
does not take a Chonse renter.
b. Whole Chonse: when the household makes a lump sum deposit
large enough to cover the full amount of the implicit rent
for the entire unit. However, the main household chose to
sublet to another family as a substitute to mortgage loans in
order to restructure its assets.
c. Partial Chonse: when the household does not have enough assets
to rent an entire unit and must share it with the landlord or
else a Whole Chonse renter--and even at low-income levels with
another tenant family. Partial Chonse therefore coexist in
one unit with either Whole Chonse or outright ownership. This
12/ For modern apartment units in Seoul, ratios of chonse to housing price
can go as high as 70% of the unit's value and the absolute value of the financial
claim can be startlingly large in high income neighborhoods. For instance, the
Office of National Tax Administration (ONTA) reported in 1987 that a Hyundai
apartment in Apkujong-dong a quality district of Seoul was posted at 243 million
won for tax purposes, or 3 million per pyong (one pyong is 3.3 m2). For a
typical 55-pyong Hyundai apartment the Chonse deposit can therefore vary between
US$75,000 and US$133,000. For reference, the average annual urban household
expenditures were about US$6,570 in 1987.
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tenure arrangement is one of the most widespread rental
arrangement in Korean cities.
d. Standard Chonse: when the household provides the full-lump
payment and expects to raise the contract amount at each
contract renewal or periodic rent raise.
e. Declining Chonse: when the household makes a smaller one-time
deposit from whicii an agreed amount is deducted every month.
The remaining balance will be returned when the tenant vacates
the unit.
(c) Monthly Rental with Deposit. This rental contract is the same
as in other countries. However, in some cases the deposit
requirement can also be high and is often equal to one year's
rent--not income. This security deposit does not have the
contractual saving feature of Chonse: rental is cash-flow based,
and not asset based. This form of tenure is considered the least
desirable and characterizes the lowest income groups. Monthly
renters usually share the unit with the landlord as well as other
tenants.
There tends to be a systematic and stable relationship between household choices
among these three major types of tenures, the specific financial agreements
chosen for the structure of Chonse and the socio-economic characteristics of the
households such as age of household head, household earnings, current financial
assets and net worth. This entire housing tenure structure is summarized in
Figure 2.
C. An Analysis of Two Key Financial Functions of Chonse
3.10 As a financial instrument of the non-corporate sector, Chonse has two
possible uses for the seller of the claim. It can finance investment in
business-related activities directly or through redeposit on the curb market or
it can finance the purchase of housing. For the 25-year period covered in this
paper, business-related use of Chonse has fluctuated according to the intensity
of financial repression generated by financial sector policies. The specific
business use of Chonse funds cannot be investigated further due to the wide
diversity of investments to be considered. As yet, there is no direct evidence
on the split of Chonse funds between business uses and housing investment over
time. What can be done is to analyze Chonse as an alternate source of
residential mortgage finance. In that case, the leading question is what happens
in housing markets which are subjected to severe credit constraints and where
the demand for housing services is a function of accumulated financial assets
through the size of Chonse.
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FIGURE 2: INCOME, FINANCIAL ASSETS AND HOUSING TENURE CHOICE IN KOREA
High Financial Savings
(and Income)
(1) FULL OWNERSHIP of a Unit. Exclusive Use
(2) CHONSE claims:
Partial Use Exclusive Use
Whole Refund
2.a 2.b
Declining 2.c rare
Refund
(3) PURE MONTHLY RENTAL
Low Income
(little or no financial savings)
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Market Conditions Affectinj The Collateral Value of Housing and the Chonse Ratio
3.11 The ratio of Chonse deposit to the value of housing is a measure of
the collateral value of housing for borrowers. In an unconstrained world with
unsegmented financial markets and no capital gains on housing, users of housing
are expected to be indifferent to the choice of tenure between ownership, Chonse
and pure rental. The rent would be equal both to the value of the unit times
the curb market interest rate and the Chonse deposit times the curb rate. 131
Rent = [housing price] x [ curb rate]= [Chonse deposit] x [ curb rate]
or:
R = [P] x [Ic] = [C] x [Ic] (1)
Under such assumptions, we would therefore expect the size of Chonse to equal
the market price of the house, but this is not the case: Chonse has often varied
between 30 percent and 70 percent of the house price.
3.12 At least two factors may be at work in determining the level of Chonse:
(i) the expected after-tax rate of appreciation of housing and (ii) segmentation
in the capital markets such that the housing rental rate (rate of return on
housing ) might differ significantly from the financial cost of funds, with a
further differentiation between the curb rate and the corporate bond rate. Given
the extreme scarcity of mortgage finance for most of the period, the relevant
cost of funds in the housing sector has been the curb rate. This rate has been
much higher than the opportunity cost of capital in the economy (See Table 1,
Columns 7 and 9). Anticipating on the evaluation of Chonse, one could therefore
expect an underinvestment in the housing sector due to the great difference in
the cost of capital in the sector and opportunity cost of capital in the economy
at large.
3.13 The relevant interest rate being the curb rate and the Korean rental
market being quite competitive (viz. the high rate of renter mobility), the
amount of Chonse can be expressed as a function of the curb rate and the rate
of appreciation of housing. On one hand, Chonse must match curb market rates
as said earlier in equation (1):
[Rent] = [ Chonse] x [curb rate] or,
.L/ Of course, the rent level is also linked to the tightness of housing
market conditions. In Korea housing demand has risen very rapidly with household
incomas and urban population growth which housing supply has been found to a
lower elasticity than other countries. the net effect has been rising real
rents autonomously from conditions on the curb market. KIM Kyung-Hwan has shown
that public policies have tended to prevent the flow of capital in housing
markets and that the real return to housing has been substantially above the
opportunity cost of capital for much of the rent period. (see Kim, 1987)
- 18 -
R = C x Ic (1)
On the other hand, the total return on housing for its owner includes the
anticipated capital gains rate such that an acceptable rental rate may be:
[Rent] = [Unit Price] x [ curb rate less capital gains rate]
R = P x [Ic - Ia] (2)
When combining these two considerations, the new formulation of the Chonse ratio
becomes:
C = P x [ 1 - Ia/Ic] (3)
This relationship provides a good starting point for interpreting Chonse ratios
over time or across markets, as well as the impact of the sharp increas-s in
capital gains taxes since the mid-1970s. We can expect the following comparative
static results:
(a) Chonse ratios will increase when the curb rate decreases as has
been the secular trend since 1963 (see Figure l.b).
(b) Chonse ratios will decrease in market areas where the rate of
appreciation is high.
(c) However, in the "anti-speculation areas" where severe capital
gains tax are levied, the net after-tax capital gains has been
drastically lowered. We would therefore expect higher Chonse
ratios in these areas. This is why Chonse ratios are so high in
some of the high-income apartment areas of Seoul (See Annex Table
on the record of anti-speculation measures since the 1960s.)
(d) In disequilibrium markets where the rate of appreciation may be
temporarily falling, such as in 1984-1985 when housing prices
declined by 7 percent (see Table 1, column 15), we might expect
to see paradoxical cases of Chonse ratios becoming greater than
one. Such cases have been analyzed by Kim and Chai (1987) who
explore the reasons why renters who deposit a Chonse that is more
than enough to buy the unit outright did not exercise that option
in the years 1984 and 1985. They find that high capital gains
taxes where a leading factor in not exercising the option to buy.
Role of Chonse in Gaining Access to Housing
3.14 In a market where the supply of mortgage finance is sharply rationed
the ability to save will determine the choice of tenure and affect the household
portfolios. The degree of "incompleteness" of household asset "portfolios" will
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be even more pronounced than in a well developed financial market.' 4 The choice
of tenure in the Korean market is not only determined by income levels but also
by the amount of Chonse, i.e. by the level of financial assets already
accumulated. It is therefore necessary to analyze the role of Chonse in tenure
choices in order to have a better understanding of the distributive impact of
mortgage rationing across households income groups.
3.15 The ratio of Chonse to unit value just described is an implicit measure
of the collateral value of housing for the landlord. It is also possible to
illustrate how access to housing varies according to the characteristics of a
household (income, and accumulated assets) and market conditions (interest
rates, rate of housing appreciation, and loan-to-value ratio available from
financial institutions) .15
1. Case of a Renter
3.16 A renter must maximize his utility subject to his (cash-flow) budget
constraint such that:
[earned + non-earned income] = [housing consumption] + [non-housing cons.] (4)
or:
y + Ic.A = R + NH (5)
where:
A = total financial assets, including Chonse
Ic= curb market rate
R - rent for the housing unit (or part of it)
NH= non-housing consumption
Part or all of the assets A is required for the Chonse in lieu of rent that is
to say Ic is equal to R. By definition renters cannot benefit from capital gains
on housing. A rise in housing value will lead to an increase in Chonse deposit
by renters. In turn, this increase will have to be financed from new savings
out of y. For this reason, at equal levels of income y, the housing consumption
of renters will tend to be less than that of owners. In other words, a result
of the Chonse system is that access to that prevalent form of rental tenure is
14/ On the issue of the incompleteness of household portfolios in advanced
financial markets, see the papers of the recent NBER Conference on Residential
Real Estate and Capital Formation, Newport, R.I. October 1988.
L5 / A full treatment of housing demand under rapid income growth, inflation
and mortgage rationing is well beyond the purpose of this paper. For some key
readings on the issues of liquidity constraints and asset constraints see
Modigliani (1954), Tobin (1967, 1972), Artle and Varaya (1978), Dougherty and
Van Order (1982), Wheaton (1985) and, for the Korea case, Cho (1988).
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based on asset accumulation and not on current income cash-flow. 161
2. Case of a Buyer
3.17 Several factors make it very desirable to own housing in Korea. The
preference for exclusive ownership is strong: without real estate or other
collateral it is very difficult to borrow from the financial markets, either
formal or informal; renters often have to double up with their landlords and may
have to move when their Chonse is increased, causing the high rate of mobility
reported in the censuses; the bequest motive is very strong in East Asian
societies; 17J the rate of appreciation of housing has been higher than either
inflation and income increases. In a simple comparative static framework,
households will aim to maximize their utility based on housing and non-housing
consumption. They are subject to two main constraints: a budget constraint and
a credit constraint linked to the value of the housing unit. The cash-flow
budget constraint irrespective of anticipated capital gains for an owner-occupant
can be written again as:18 1
[earned + non-earned income] = [housing consumption] +[non-housing) (4)
or:
y + Ic.A = [Ic (P - B) + Ib. B] + NH (5)
where:
A= total financial assets, including Chonse
P= the price of the housing unit
B= total borrowing (formal or informal)
Ib= the interest rate on borrowing
NH= non-housing consumption
If all borrowing is on the curb market, the budget constraint becomes:
y = Ic.[P -A] + NH (6)
The credit constraint is such that the value of the unit must be no more than
16/ In his life-cycle simulation of the tenure decision, Cho finds a jump
in housing consumption after a change of tenure to ownership. (1988, pp.128-
129).
11/ See Hayashi and others, 1987, Horioka (1988) and Cho, Chapter VI
(1988).
it8/ See Cho (1988)
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the sum of assets A and the maximum feasible borrowinig B:
P _< A + B (7)
If we designate by b the maximum loan-to-value ratio, the credit constraint is
simply:
P _< A / (1 - b) (8)
It must be understood that this credit constraint can be read in two ways. If
the borrower is fortunate enough to get a KHB loan, b is the mortgage loan-to-
value ratio. If not, b simply reflects the collateral value of the house on
the curb market; that is to say that it should equal the Chonse ratio. Under
these two simultaneous budget and credit constraints it is possible to explore
the feasible space for ownership.
3.18 Under mortgage rationing, access to a bank mortgage loan will generate
a dual benefit. The new landlord can take a Chonse according to the on-going
Chonse/unit price ratio. He can also receive a collateralized mortgage. This
in effect sharply raises ,currently doubles, the total collateral value of the
unit for investment purpose.19/ This happens because to the bank's loan-to-
value ratio can be added the chonse ratio. Moreover, the total cost of borrowing
is greatly more favorable (see Figure 5.b, below). We can therefore expect KHB
borrowers who are first-time owners to make extensive use of Chonse from a tenant
and to have some of the highest housing-to-income ratios. A dynamic effect of
falling curb market rates is to raise the possible Chonse ratio and therefore
b, with the result that asset-constrained buyers can now get closer to their
unconstrained optimum. Not surprisingly, housing markets function better when
curb rates fall.
3.19 Similarly, an increase in the assets of an individual will bring him
closer to his unconstrained optimum. With rapid rates of housing appreciation,
this is what is happening with previous owners who are upgrading their units.
On the other hand, when housing prices are stable or are falling as seen since
1982 (Table 1, col. 15), constrained choices will diverge even more from the
optimum. In the case of first time buyers, we can expect to see frequent
occurrences of asset transfers from relatives to release the constraints.
3.20 We can also ask what is the partial effect of an increase in income.
An increase in income expands the budget constraint without improving the credit
constraint. Since asset formation is not necessarily linked functionally to this
rising income, household asset formation can be expected to be less efficient
and suboptimal in the absence of banking services for households and household
firms. An improvement of housing conditions will depend on which is the greater
of the two: the rate of household saving and asset formation or the rate of
housing appreciation. Across the housing market, there is a split between first
19/ Of course the buyer is giving up part of the use of the unit to his
Chonse tenant for a significant period of time.
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time buyers and previous owners and a growing divergence in achievable
consumption and welfare.
Chonse is Effective. But is it Financially Efficient?
3.21 Without belaboring the point, there is a clear distinction between
Chonse's effectiveness in meeting the financial needs of the non-corporate sector
and its financial efficiency. This financial claim offers none of the benefits
of institutional financial intermediation in terms of risk diversification, time
intermediation, or denomination intermediation. Since Chonse's reference rate
is the curb rate, its inefficiency can be measured by the spread between the curb
rate and the corporate bond yield (Table 1, cols. 7 and 9). As already noted,
in Korea the corporate bond yield is considered the best proxy to the level of
the opportunity cost of capital in the economy. 20J
20/ See Dornbusch and Park (1987).
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IV. RESULTING STRUCTURE OF THE HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM
A. Sources of Funds for Housing Asset Acquisition
4.01 Considered as financial claims, the volume of Chonse contracts is
considerably larger than outstanding institutional lending for housing. The
Chonse system was estimated on the basis of simple ratios to be about 5.5 times
larger than the residential mortgage loans outstanding in the institutional
housing finance system in 1980.211 The results of the KRIHS survey of household
assets also indicate that Chonse funds used in the purchase of housing were five
to six times larger that the volume of mortgage lending provided by KHB in 1986.
Table 2 provides the first overview ever taken of housing finance strategies
followed by households at various income levels in Korea. While the situation
might be different from twenty years ago, this table gives a comprehensive view
of the funds available to finance housing in 1986. Its limitation is to
aggregates flows of funds across four different categories of buyers: first-
time buyers; owners who are moving up; those lucky enough to get a mortgage loan
and the vast majority of those who don't. Otherwise, the large role of informal
finance Table 2 is quite clear. The fragmented nature of the financing of
housing is also very conspicuous: 13 sources of funds need to be listed. A
variety of informal sources are used: returned Chonse funds (column 2), kye
(ROSCA, column 4), curb market loans (column 9), Chonse deposit from renters
(column 10). The composition of financing for the highest and the lowest income
groups among buyers is presented in Figures 3.a and 3.b. The data supports very
well the theoretical analysis: high-income groups are heavily asset-dependent
and lower-income buyers are more dependent on Chonse. In both cases, financing
appears more fragmented than it really is because individual strategies can
differ significantly. Such strategies can be understood better through an
analysis of the sub-population of buyers who get a KHB mortgage loan.
B. Coping With Rationed Mortgage Lending: The Household Hunt for Funds
4.02 As Table 2 shows, it takes skill and hard work to put together the
financing of a housing unit. Even those who have access to mortgage loans have
difficulties because the loan-to-value ratio offered by KHB is low.
21/ At the time of the 1980 Census, the total stock of housing (urban and
rural) was 7.9 million units. 58.7% of the units were owner-occupied, 23.9% were
under a Chonse contract, 15.3% were under monthly rental and 1.9% were under
other arrangements such as free employee housing. Additional Chonse contracts
in shared dwelling units are not captured by the Census which focuses on units
and the tenure contract of its primary occupant. At that time the urban ratio
of housing units to households was as low as 59% percent. In other words, 31%
of all urban households had only partial use of their units and had to share
them with others. Census data and housing surveys show that crowding in rental
units is very frequent for low-income groups. A similar analysis will be done
with the recently published 1985 housing census.
Table 2: KOREA: SOURCES OF FUNDS FOR HOUSING PURCHASES BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME LEVEL FOR ALL HOUSEHOLDS, 1986
SALE OF RETURNED SAVINGS & RYE SALE KHB FORMAL WORK CURB CHONSEIl ASSISTANCE WORK OTHERS TOTAL
HH INCOME\ PREVIOUS CHONSE1 SECURITIES REAL LOAN LOAN PLACE MARKET DEPOSIT FROM PARENT PLACE
10,000 WON\ HOUSE DEPOSIT ESTATE LOAN LOAN FROM RENTER OR RELATIVE GRANTS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
1-10 11.9 23.9 31.3 6.0 1.5 4.5 0.0 0.0 6.0 3.0 3.0 1.5 7.4 100.00
11-20 11.9 23.8 27.7 8.9 5.6 2.6 1,0 0.3 6.9 1.7 5.6 0.3 3.7 100.00
21-30 8.6 26.3 28.8 8.1 3.7 1.8 1.8 0.4 4.7 4.6 7.8 0.4 3.0 100.00
31-40 10.5 22.5 29.3 8.9 2.6 2.5 2.8 1.4 5.4 4.5 7.3 0.2 2.1 100.00
41-50 12.7 18.9 29.5 9.4 2.9 3.8 2.6 1.3 4.9 5.3 5.8 0.2 2.7 100.00
51-70 16.2 15.5 26.4 8.3 3.0 4.9 3.9 0.6 5.0 6.3 7.1 0.2 2.6 100.00
71-100 18.3 13.0 26.5 7.4 3.8 8.6 2.4 1.1 4.1 6.2 6.4 0.3 1.9 100.00
over 100 23.9 7.1 29.5 6.7 4.5 3.4 6.3 0.4 2.6 7.1 6.0 1.2 1.3 100.00
Source: Research on Policies to Strengthen the Housing Finance System.
Interim Report, December 1986, Based on New KRISH Survey, p. 69.
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Institutional lending is further restricted to a favored market segment: units
must be less than five-year old and they must be under 82.5 m2 in size. Using
the KHB's 1985 survey of its borrowers, it is possible to rank the most
successful strategies followed by this favored minority of households. Two
tables are provided covering first-time buyers and previous owners that are
trading-up. These tables have the same structure. Borrowers are regrouped
according to the composition of their financing from eight major sources of
funds. Strategies are ranked in descending order of frequency (Column 9). For
each group the tables gives mean household income (10), the price of the unit
(11), the down payment (12), the loan-to-value ratio (13) and the ratio of the
price of the unit to the annual income of the household (14). While based on
Korea, these tables on sources of funds are expected to be typical of economies
where the supply of mortgage finance is significantly rationed. It is also
typical of this mortgage rationing and consistent with the earlier analysis of
constrained tenure choices to find that KHB borrowers are more often previous
owners (53.2 percent) than first-time buyers (46.8). This happens in spite of
the fact that KHB is a public sector bank whose social priority is to encourage
first-time ownership.
4.03 The critical role played by Chonse for first-time home buyers in Table
3.a is very evident. These new buyers rely heavily on their returned Chonse (Row
1). Buyers who rely exclusively on a KHB loan and their assets are not
exploiting fully the collateral value of their housing and therefore have the
lowest price/income ratio (Row 2). As could be expected , given the range of
unit values available on the market, buyers with the highest price/income ratios
are those taking the Chonse deposit of a renter to realize fully the collateral
value of their unit (Row 3). They become jointly landlords and owners, reduce
their housing consumption and maximize expected capital gains. Asset transfers
from relative are very large when they take place and also lead to high
price/income ratios (Rows 4 and 6). It must be noted that unit-value/income
ratios are high in Korea by international standards. Average market ratios of
the order of 3.0 are found in well functioning housing markets with fully
developed housing finance systems. Within a given market, these ratios vary as
shown by the Korean data and housing taxation can play a significant role in this
regard.
4.04 The case of previous owners is presented in Table 3.b. A very high
proportion of 43 percent rely strictly on housing capital gains when they are
trading-up (Row 1). Those who exploit the collateral value of their new purchase
either by taking a Chonse renter (Row 3) or additional loans (Row 4 and 5) aim
at a high price/income ratio, in some cases as high as 6.4.
C. Overall Structure of the Housing Finance System
4.05 The structure of the total housing finance system for 1984 is presented
in Figure 4 based on data compiled from various sources. Compared to Table 2
which is based on 1986 data, Figure 4 appears to overstate the contribution of
institutional finance to the housing sector: according to the 1986 survey, KHB
loans would have been much less than 8 percent of total funds (see Table_,
column 6). However, the main implications of Figure 5 are robust. The Korea
institutional housing finance system is small and limited to a few specialized
Table 3-a KOREA: STRATEGIES FOLLOWED BY HOUSEHOLDS TO PURCHASE HOUSING; FIRST HOME BUYERS
Sale of Returned Financ.ial Assistanc Loans. from Chonsel Frequency Hous ehold Price of Amout of Loa-to Price/
Strategies KHB Loan Previoc Cho...el Savings from Parent Financ ial from Income---- -. Struture Donpayment Value (5) Incom (Yr.)
House Deposit or Relative Institute Renter Others H S (Mean) (Mean) (Mea) (Mean) (Mean)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (H) (9) (10) (15) (12) (13) (14)
1 596.06 601.55 949.55 317 49.30 52.20 2147.15 1551.09 30.08 3.899
(30.08) (29.39) (41.53)
2 596.91 1683.52 97 15.09 62.19 22B0.42 1683.52 29.61 3.69
(29.61) (70.39)
3 696.21 433.96 1066.36 428.64 66 10.26 43.55 2605.15 1909.91 28.08 5 51
(28.0B) (17.25) (38.63) (16.04)
4 583.85 632.69 821.95 527.08 65 10.11 52.65 2565.57 1991.72 25.61 4 75
(25.61) (23.66) (30.60) (20.13))
5 600.00 637 56 745.41 499.05 41 6.39 53.22 2469.02 1969.02 25.96 4 52
(29.64) (25.96) (29.97) (19.31)
4 645.31 926.97 976.75 32 4.99 42.75 2449.03 1903 72 29.05 5 3 4
(29.05) (37.05) (33.90)
7 640.00 445.20 712.40 547.20 25 3.99 52.76 2)44 HI 1704 90 29.44 4 19
(29 64) (19.79) (29.19) (22.40)
643 150
So-rce KHB, Surey of the HouIng Units Flna-ced by the KHBN. 1995.
HN--t-e 3, 1988
Table 3.6: KOREA: STRATEGIES FOLLOWED BY HOUSEHOLDS TO PURCHASE HOUSING; PREVIOUS 0OWHERS
Sal o' f Returned Financ Iia Assistance Loans fro ch..sci Frequency Houshold Price of A-ont of Loan-to- Price)
Strategies KHB Loan. Previous. Chonsel Savings fro- Parent Financial from--------- Income Structure D-upayment Value (0) Incom- (yr.)
House Deposit or Relative lnstitution Renter Others N S (Mean) (Mean) (Mean) (Mean) (Mean)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (55) (11) (12) (13) (14)
1618.25 1989.20 315 43.09 58.83 2607.45 1989.20 25.86 4.37
(25.86) (74.14)
2 630.26 1554.47 705.68 304 41.59 60.18 2890.42 2260.35 2 3.,44 4 .63
(23.44) (52.70) (23.86)
3 712.50 1751.09 753.44 434.22 64 8.76 53.11 3651.25 2938.75 21.74 6.43
(21.74) (46.03) (20.24) (11.99)
4 608.33 1684.17 522.50 462.50 24 3.28 61.04 3277.50 2669.17 19.06 5.02
(19.06) (49.22) (16.99) (14.74) N
02
531.25 1486.67 780.42 24 3.28 56.35 2790.33 2267.08 21.05 4.58
(21.05) (51.50) (23.37)
7 31 105
Source KHB, Survey of the Hous.ing Units Financed by the KHB)8 1985.
Noveber 3. 1988
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lenders. The Korea Housing Bank has a de facto monopoly position because it also
manages public finance funds, and commercial banks have no activity at all in
residential mortgage lending. The potential benefits from financial
liberalization in the sector can be judged by the large value of outstanding
Chonse contracts. With the high rate of domestic savings now achieved housing
finance diversification is highly feasible both in terms of additional
institutions and in terms of types mortgage instruments to meet the
differentiated needs of various social groups. In 1984, institutional sources
provided only one-fourth of the funds required for new housing alone without
speaking a transactions for existing units. The informal market provides the
balance. Within the formal sector, public finance sources such as the budget
and national housing funds deposit schemes provided one-half of the mortgage
lending.
4.06 Since Korean households have been using Chonse as a substitute to
contractual savings at a bank, this raises the question of why banks would not
offer savings contracts that are competitive, safer, and more convenient than
Chonse. Because of controls on lending rates and direct Ministry of Finance
guidelines, commercial banks have not lent to households and most of the
unincorporated sector. On the other hand, since the mid-1970s the Korea Housing
Bank was allowed to offer a saving instrument competitive with the curb market:
the Worker Asset Formation Savings Deposit (WAFD). These accounts have offered
interest rates of the order of 24 percent per annum depending on the exact terms
of the deposit contract, providing very high real yields in recent years. The
WAFD is heavily subsidized by the government since KHB funds only between 7.5-
8.0 percent of the interest payments and the government pays the balance.
Maximum limits are currently imposed on the income of the savers. WAFD became
a major source of deposits for KHB during the high inflation period. However,
during that very same period of extreme credit allocation the KHB balance sheets
show that it had to redeposit a high share of its funds with the National
Investr,.ent Fund (NIF) to be used for the heavy industry investment program and
other "policy loans". There could hardly be a clearer case of mortgage
rationing.
4.07 Since the beginning of financial liberalization, the terms of WAFD have
been made less attractive to savers through the income ceiling and the scheme
has been made available to other banks, especially Citizens National Bank which
is rapidly becoming the bank of the household sector. WAFD deposits still
represented about 14 percent of KHB deposits and 17 percent of its loanable funds
in 1985. With the end of forced redeposits into the NIF and high real return
on deposits KHB has been able to increase its mortgage lending steadily.
Nonetheless, KHB is still managing a policy-induced shortage of funds.
4.08 The institutional housing finance system remains highly segregated from
the rest of the financial sector. The level of the mortgage rate offered by
KHB is still typical of a severely rationed mortgage system and remains a barrier
to entry into the sector either by banks or non-bank financial institutions.
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FIGURE 4: STRUCTURE OF THE HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM IN KOREA (1984 FLOWS)
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(13.4%)
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(LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES)
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Sources: These estimates are based on various sources, including Bank of
Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook. 1985;_KRIHS A Study on Housing
Problems (1985) and World Bank, Korea Housin( Finance System, June
1986 (5807-KO).
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The spread between the mortgage rate and the curb market is still large as seen
in Figures 5.a and 5.b. What matters more for the liberalization of housing
finance is that the spread between the mortgage rate and corporate rate have
been closing (See Table 1, cols. 8 and 9 and also Figure 5.b). There are now
significant opportunities to displace the costly curb market financing of housing
with efficient mortgage loans.221
22/ See Renaud (1986)
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V. IMPACTS OF CHONSE AND BENEFITS OF PROGRESSIVE
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION
A. Impacts of Severe Mortgage Rationing and Curb Market Rates
"The nineteenth-century invention of the amortized loan is of such importance
in housing economics that it should rank with the invention of the steam engine
in changing the face of Britain" (A.A. Nevitt, 1966).
5.01 Chonse clearly is a useful instrument from the viewpoint of meeting
important financial needs not satisfied by institutions. Unfortunately, it also
has undesirable features. The operations of the real estate market in Korea are
asset-based, and low-income households are negatively affected. This trait is
common to most developing countries. It may be that in Korea, Chonse alleviates
more of the impacts of policies rationing the non-corporate sector than in other
economies. Possibly, inequalities may become even wider in countries where
similar systems have not develop, or did so on a much smaller scale. In any
case, in Korea we can observe two kinds of distributive distortions: intra-
sectoral distortions within the housing sector, and intersectoral distortions
in investment allocation across sectors.
Distortions Within the Housing Sector
5.02 Economic and financial efficiency are not the only concerns in the area
of non-corporate finance: the performance of the housing sector also has
distributive implications. The questions of equity and what to do with credit
subsidies are ever present. As banking systems now stand in developing
countries, it is clear that informal finance provides services that are essential
to the housing of low and middle income households. What needs to be discussed
further is the extent to which such informal finance services while solving
urgent problems may have negative dynamic impacts on both household wealth
distribution and income distribution.
5.03 The degree to which the three basic tenure groups of owners, Chonse
tenants and pure renters becomes more sharply segmented in periods of high
inflation and/or rapid real estate appreciation has not yet been well documented.
However, the evidence on the composition and allocation of the housing stock fits
the conceptual analysis well. In the context of rapidly rising living standards,
in particular, it is a well documented fact that relative rental conditions at
the bottom end of the housing market have been worsening in most cities,
particularly the large ones.23t
23/ Conditions in rental housing markets have been extensively documented
in several studies made by the Korean Research Institute on Human Settlements
(KRIHS) attached to the Ministry of Construction and the Korea National Housing
Corporation in 1980 and 1985. In particular, see KHRIS (1985), chapter 4.
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5.04 Direct public assistance to the lowest income groups is part of public
policy. Subsidies to housing exist in every country in the world for various
reasons, but they do not necessarily achieve their intended redistributive
objectives. Essentially, subsidies to housing can be provided through three main
channels: direct up-front subsidies (in-kind through subsidized input prices
or up-front through fiscal grants), through the taxation system, and through the
financial system. Among these three alternatives credit subsidies are the most
problematic. In particular, preferential lending rates have often been mandated
to promote politically desirable activities or to benefit marginal groups. These
preferential lending rates are often rationalized on the basis of high or
"usurious" interest rates in the informal markets. Unfortunately, in country
after country the findings are that housing subsidies through credit are
regressive and favor the better off. This finding is very similar to the
experience with rural credit which is one of the other major components of non-
corporate finance. 24 Moreover, among all forms of credit subsidies to various
sectors, it can be argued that housing credit subsidies are the least efficient
due to the long maturity of housing mortgage loans which leverages the negative
impacts of such subsidies. Credit subsidies favor the largest borrowers and they
are also much less transparent than well targeted open subsidies.
5.05 If, as the Korea case shows, mortgage rationing and informal housing
finance also tends to lead to regressive distribute results, financial policies
toward households and their main asset, housing finance policies have little
choice but to walk a narrow path toward neutrality. These neutral financial
policies would be policies which neither aim to provide housing finance services
at subsidized interest rates nor attempt to ration the household sector out of
institutional finance services.251 Practical actions need to fit the political
reality and financial history of each country.
Distortions Across the Economy
5.06 The deliberate rationing of banking services to the household sector
was compounded by inflation until 1982. Looking at the stock of wealth, the
impact of this rationing is apparent through a comparison of the National Wealth
Surveys of 1968 and 1977. Contrary to what one would expect in a rapidly
developing economy, but consistent with financial repression which was
particularly severe in the late 1970s, the share of financial assets in total
24/ For a good analysis of rural credit issues see Dale W. Adams, Douglas
H. Graham and J.D. Von Pischke. Undermining Rural Development with Subsidized
Credit, Westview Press, 1988. In particular, see Claudio Gonzales-Vega's two
chapters on "the Iron Law of Interest-Rate Restrictions" and "Cheap Agricultural
Credit: Redistribution in Reverse". For a recent paper on the impact of
government intervention see C. Bell, T.N. Srinivasan, and C. Udry "Agricultural
Credit Markets in Punjab: Segmentation, Rationing and Spillover," unpublished
paper, June 1988.
25L For an elaboration on the Korean case, see Renaud (1986).
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wealth fell from 20.69 percent in 1968 to 16.2 percent in 1977.26/ Of equal
interest is the fact that the share of residential buildings fell from 23.8
percent to 15.1 percent during this period which has been the most massive period
of urbanization that Korea will ever know.
5.07 Looking at annual investment flows, careful estimates integrating
national accounts data, National Wealth Survey data and sectoral censuses
indicate that the national real gross capital stock expanded at an average rate
of 9.72 percent between 1960 and 1985. However, the dwelling stock expanded
the slowest of all major sectors at 6.85 percent.271 This low growth contrasts
with the high urban population growth and large income gains which are two
primary determinants of the demand for housing. In Korea the rate of increase
in number of dwellings has fallen noticeably behind the sum of the urban
population growth rate and the household real income growth rate over the period.
This is true even after adjusting for an income elasticity estimate of denmand
of 0.7 which is the median estimate for Korea so far and taking into accoainc a
low price elasticity which is estimated at around 0.2 ( the more significant
user-cost elasticity still remains to be estimated).
5.08 This evidence of housing investment rationing is fully consistent with
the Kim (1987) findings of a market segmentation between the real estate sector
and the rest of the capital markets where his estimates for the real rate of
return to housing for both single family units and multiple family units exceeded
by 40 percent to 50 percent corporate bond yields which are the best indicators
of the financial cost of capital in Korea. As long as the curb rate is the
reference rate for housing and interest rate discrimination between curb markets
and institutional markets exists, this will continue to happen. Under
unsegmented investment markets the yields should be much closer. Moreover,
financial policies have interacted with rigid regulatory policies in the urban
sector to restrict the supply of housing and prevent a more satisfactory
allocation of resources across sectors of the economy. 2 81
Economic Reforms and Trends Toward Increasing Market Integration
5.09 An analysis of the Chonse system cannot ignore the rapidly improving
financial environment, especially since 1982. Macroeconomic reforms have
successfully interacted with the move toward financial liberalization which
began in the non-bank financial sector and included divestiture of government
ownership of commercial banks, widening of interest rate bands, positive real
deposit rates, and a rapid expansion of securities market. The financial economy
adjusts more rapidly than the real economy to changing monetary policies,
interest rate policies and the degree of price stability. Since the rapid and
successful implementation of these policies during the period 1980-84, including
cautious liberalization, the growth of the institutional finance sector has been
extremely rapid. Inflation has fallen from 28 percent in 1980 to less than 3
26/ See J.H.K. Han (1987)
27/ See Hak K. Pyo (1987).
28/ See Renaud (1988).
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FIGURE 5.a
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percent until 1987 (See Figure 6.b). Real rates on time deposits have risen
sharply from -7.1 percent in 1980 to 7.0 percent in 1984 and are now high by
international standards, reflecting in part the troubled commercial banking
system with its low net worth and portfolio of bad loans from the late 1970s.
5.10 A most significant adjustment in household debt composition is the move
away from informal markets which ceased to be the dominant source of funds for
the first time in 1985, as follows:291
Source of loans \Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Financial Institutions 20.0 30.1 38.5 43.0 50.4 %
Unregulated Markets 9.7 69.2 61.0 56.3 49.0 %
Others 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.6 %
Nonetheless, restrictions on mortgage financial services to households remain
significant. The benefits of this cautious liberalization seem to have been
reaped mostly by the upper income households (top 20 percent) who diversified
their assets away from real estate. For the majority of urban households,
mortgage debt as a key operational variable in meeting asset diversification
objectives is not yet a factor in Korea. Korean household portfolios remain
quite incomplete. Only a few class of assets are held by most households. They
still face serious problems of asset indivisibility, high transaction costs,
asset management costs, and tax effects. In spite of its financial
inefficiencies and rigid links to housing collateral, Chonse remains the leading
debt instrument.
Housing Markets in an Open Economy: Sensitivity to the Current Account
5.11 Only a small proportion of housing finance comes from monetary
institutions and there is great housing market dependency on liquidity. With
the appearance of a current account surplus, the conduct of monetary and
financial policy is now moving from the management of scarce funds to that of
a competitive allocation of funds. This causes some transitional problems. In
the housing sector this transition has been marked by a sharp rise in housing
prices in 1987 which contrast with continuing overall price stability. (See
Figures 6.a and 6.b).
29/ Citizen National Bank, Annual Survey on the Utilization of Household
Finance, 1981 to 1985, Seoul. See J.H.K. Han , 1987, Table 17, p.31.
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FIGUIE 6. a
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B. Benefits of Progressive Housing Finance Liberalization
5.12 If we define credit rationing by the fact that the after-tax cost of
mortgage debt is lower that the after-tax cost of own equity this is still very
much the case in Korea. Given the structure of retail savings markets and its
public sector constraints, it may be difficult for the Korea Housing Bank to
change its lending structure quickly. On the other hand, mortgage lending by
non-bank financial intermediaries at market cost seems to be a very promising
route to liberalize the housing finance system in Korea. As noted in another
paper, the urban policy regulatory framework also needs to be adjusted and the
structure of real estate taxation need to be fully integrated into an overall
fiscal strategy from the sector. Housing finance policies interventions need
to move away for a piecemeal ad hoc approach that is lacking in long-term
consistency and effectiveness.
Does Rationing Mortgage Supply Stimulate Additional Household Savings?
5.13 A rejoinder to liberalization is the question whether rationing the
supply of mortgage services is favorable to higher rates of household savings.
After all, the Korean case shows clearly that households must accumulate large
amount of savings prior to achieving ownership. This question has been addressed
for Japan twice recently. In both cases, the answer given has been: no,
rationing the supply of mortgage loans does not appear to have been responsible
for the accelerating rate of savings by Japanese household. Household savings
seem to have been most strongly influenced by the rate of income growth and a
strong bequest motive.301 What appears to be happening is that under severe
mortgage rationing as in Japan or Korea, is that the life-cycle pattern of
savings is affected. From a theoretical viewpoint, households are prevented from
optimizing their saving-consumption pattern from period to period over time.
This evidence comes in addition to the finding of intersectoral and intrasectoral
investment distortions when mortgage lending is severely rationed. The
desirability of neutral housing finance policies is reinforced.
What Place for Housing Finance in Domestic Liberalization?
5.14 In Korea, like in many other countries, the extensive structure of
specialized banks has acted as a substitute for adequate secondary facilities
and large securities markets. Liberalization policies invite a review of these
specialized institutions. Because housing banks like KHB represent a small part
of total banking assets of specialized banks there has been a tendency to
postpone thorough analyses of the specialized housing finance sub-subsystem and
to delay discussion of the role of public banks like KHB. In that regard, the
question of the order of liberalization of the financial system is an interesting
one. It can be argued that housing finance liberalization (especially through
mortgage pricing-to-market) could precede liberalization in other areas of the
banking system owing to housing's collateral quality and associated lower credit
risk premium. At the same time it must recalled that such housing finance
i-O/ See Hayashi, Ito, Slemrod, NBER (1987) and Horioka, NBER (1988).
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reforms are not merely financial reforms. The speed and extent of reform will
also depend also on the supply of bankable assets. Increasing this supply will
require major progress qualitatively and quantitatively in two key areas: tenure
security through property registration; sound foreclosure laws and their timely
enforcement. The situation, regarding these two bottlenecks varies greatly from
country to country. In the case of Korea these two supply constraints are minor,
the liberalization issues are essentially a matter of financial policy.
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VI. CONCLUSION: TOWARD MORE NEUTRAL HOUSING FINANCE POLICIES
6.01 This paper has aimed to go beyond the mere description of Chonse as
an interesting informal financial instrument. Through an analysis of its
dynamics, the paper has also shown the information feedbacks on financial
policies that informal finance can provide. Informal instruments like Chonse
reflect the selective credit policies and interest rate controls used by a
country. The evidence in Korea is that the household sector and unincorporated
small business firms have responded very creatively to the failure of the banking
system to provide them with the services they wanted. However, severe mortgage
rationing has had serious negative effects in the form of intrasectoral
investment distortions. In spite of overall improvement in housing conditions,
there has been a relative deterioration of housing conditions for the lower-
income groups. Because the operation of rental and investment markets are asset-
based, there has been an increasing inequality of access to housing services.
Financial policies have played a key role in this situation as shown by the post-
1980 household portfolio changes made by upper income groups after the expansion
of capital markets.
6.02 From an equity point of view, reducing the severe rationing of mortgage
loans to the housing sector will also have an indirect benefit by freeing scarce
public resources to address the basic needs of the lowest-income households.
There is an issue of policy imbalance when public finance sources represent 50
percent of the total supply of mortgage lending for home ownership which does
not reach the poorest, at the same time that rental housing markets used by the
poor keep getting more crowded. Accentuating directed credit would not solve
the problem. Rather a strategy to end mortgage rationing should be an integral
part of overall financial policies.
6.03 Due to severe debt constraints on relying on foreign capital,
developing countries must successfully develop domestic savings. Household
savings are a critical component of the domestic savings markets. Household
portfolios are incomplete and dominated by housing. Appropriate policies toward
household savings and housing finance will have a critical impact on the
mobilization of household savings and financial intermediation. It is also a
fact that most developing countries are now going through their peak phase of
urbanization. Major benefits could be obtained for the efficiency of the entire
economy and the mobilization of household savings by developing (i) financial
policies, (ii) tax policies and (3) urban regulatory policies that are mutually
consistent. Piecemeal regulatory approaches have been shown repeatedly to have
negative long-term effects which might eventually prove difficult to reverse as
the urban economy grows larger.
6.04 It is important to note that the expansion of formal housing finance
depends on the supply of bankable housing assets through two key public goods:
a registration and titling process that keeps up with the rapid expansion of
.cities, and enforceable mortgage contracts including effective foreclosure laws.
Without them, the potential collateral efficiency of housing will be either
diminished or dissipated. In the case of Korea, this is not an obstacle to the
rapid development of a modern housing finance system. The main structural factor
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which could defeat the benefits of expanding the formal housing finance system
are very restrictive urban planning and zoning policies which significantly
restrict the supply of urbanized land and therefore housing. Unless urban
planning regulations are improved, an inelastic supply of housing could merely
lead to the capitalization of the efficiency gains of a better housing finance
system into higher property values, instead of improving access to middle and
lower income household to housing.
6.05 The analysis of Chonse also points at two premises which are not always
included in the analysis of urban development. The first one is that both
financial policies and urban regulatory policies have at least as much to do
with the observed efficiency of the developing city as mere physical and economic
characteristics such as population density or per capita income. The second is
that, above a minimum threshold of financial development the market share of
informal housing finance is more a measure of the inadequacy of financial sector
policies than a reflection of minimum economies of scale or of scope in providing
financial services to the sector. The analysis of informal housing finance
services currently in place can therefore provide crucial information about
desirable policy reforms. Anecdotal evidence from Asia, Latin America and Africa
suggest that techniques like Chonse are widespread. Unfortunately, such informal
finance is not yet well documented in most countries.
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